



Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe (Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej)

Publication details, including instructions for authors:
<http://www.iesw.lublin.pl/rocznik/index.php>

Shifting emphasis of the ENP: is the EaP less 'sexy'?

Tomasz Stępniewski^a
Anna Visvizi^{b,c}

^a John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

^b Institute of East-Central Europe (IESW)

^c Deree -The American College of Greece

Published online: 30 Dec 2016

To cite this article: T. Stępniewski, A. Visvizi, 'Shifting emphasis of the ENP: is the EaP less 'sexy'?', *Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe*, vol. 14, no. 6, 2016, pp. 199-210.

Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe (Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej) is a quarterly, published in Polish and in English, listed in the IC Journal Master List (Index Copernicus International). In the most recent Ministry of Science and Higher Education ranking of journals published on the Polish market the Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe received one of the highest scores, i.e. 14 points.

Tomasz Stępniewski, Anna Visvizi

Shifting emphasis of the ENP: is the EaP less 'sexy'?*

Abstract: The ENP is an offspring of the EU's ambition to manage its relations with countries located in the Southern Mediterranean. In this sense, starting with the Barcelona Process and the ensuing Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the power of political gravity in the ENP has always pulled this policy framework toward the South. From this perspective, the ability of the governments of Poland and Sweden to successfully promote the idea of the establishment of the Eastern Partnership, meant as a way of re-balancing the ENP's focus and pre-empting the emergence of a possible power vacuum in the region, deserves particular attention and applaud. To certain extent and in a forward thinking manner, once agreed upon, the EaP became a powerful instrument for the EU to manage its relations with countries beyond its eastern borders. Today, given the developments in the EU's southern and eastern neighbourhood, the salient question is if the EaP will retain the clout it requires if the EU is to efficiently manage its relations with countries Eastern Europe and in the broadly conceived post-Soviet space. The objective of this paper is outline the key problems and challenges that may protract the EU's capacity to do that.

Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Eastern Partnership (EaP), East-Central Europe, Russia, Ukraine

Introduction

The ENP is an offspring of the EU's ambition to manage its relations with countries located in the Southern Mediterranean. In this sense, starting with the Barcelona Process and the ensuing Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the power of political gravity in the ENP has always pulled this policy framework toward the South. From this perspec-

* This research project has benefited from funding under the Polish National Science Centre (NCN) grant titled 'European Neighbourhood Policy: (multi-level) governance, the reform process and the prospect of enhanced cooperation in the region', OPUS/HS5, no. 2013/09/B/HS5/04534.

tive, the ability of the governments of Poland and Sweden to successfully promote the idea of the establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), meant as a way of re-balancing the ENP's focus and pre-empting the emergence of a possible power vacuum in the region, deserves particular attention and applaud. To certain extent and in a forward thinking manner, once agreed upon, the EaP became a powerful instrument for the EU to manage its relations with countries beyond its eastern borders. Today, given the developments in the EU's southern and eastern neighbourhood as well as the developments within the EU, the salient question is if the EaP will retain the clout it requires if the EU is to efficiently manage its relations with countries located in Eastern Europe and in the broadly conceived post-Soviet space. Indeed, the same concern has been voiced by the EaP Civil Society Forum¹, whose members listed a number of issues that might have an adverse impact on the EaP and its implementation. The objective of this paper is to outline the key problems and challenges that may protract the EU's capacity to use the EaP as a means to actively manage its relations with countries beyond the EU's eastern border. To this end, first, the contingencies besetting the EaP from its onset are outlined. Then, the dynamics underpinning the EU's capacity to respond to current developments beyond the EU's eastern border are discussed. From this perspective, the question of the position of the EaP on the EU's external relations agenda is examined.

1. The EaP: an ambitious but complicated project²

● In 2008, during the EU forum, Poland and Sweden submitted a proposal of a new initiative designed as an instrument for the EU to manage its relations countries of Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. The so conceived Eastern Partnership (EaP), was approved during the first EaP Summit held in Prague in May 2009. At that time, the EaP was viewed as an addition to the ENP. The latter was launched in

- 1 EaP-CSF, 'Strategy of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum for 2015-2017', Eastern Partnership-Civil Society Forum (EaP-CSF), [http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/EaP-CSF-Strategy-2015-2017-05112014\(1\).pdf](http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/EaP-CSF-Strategy-2015-2017-05112014(1).pdf) [2016-12-12].
- 2 T. de Waal, 'Expanding the EU's Ostpolitik', *Strategic Europe*, 24 October 2011, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45792> [2016-12-18].

May 2004³ and meant an intensification of relations between the EU and such countries as Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁴ The EaP's objective was to foster the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.⁵ On 29-30th September 2011, in Warsaw, the second EaP Summit was held. The representatives of all EU member states and the EaP partner-countries, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, attended the summit. The summit was also attended by representatives of EU institutions: the European Parliament, European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The summit took place during Poland's presidency in the European Council. A successful implementation of the EaP project was to become the key feature of the presidency of Poland. Discussions during the summit were dominated by three main issues: financial issues, i.e. the amount of EU resources to be committed to the EaP partner-countries; the visa regime toward the EaP partner-countries, and the question of Belarus⁶. The EaP is an ambitious project and constitutes significant progress in relation to previous initiatives concerning the east. However, as proved by the Warsaw Summit, a larger involvement of the EU in its eastern neighbourhood seems considerably complicated.⁷

During the third EaP Summit, held in Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013, Ukraine was planned to sign the previously negotiated EU accession agreement. However, Viktor Yanukovich, the president of Ukraine at that time, resigned from signing the agreement. On the other hand, Georgia and Moldova signed the accession papers, which also include the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs).

3 *Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004.

4 Council of the European Union, *Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit*, 7 May 2009, 8435/09, Presse 78, Prague, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-data/en/er/107589.pdf [2016-12-18].

5 European Parliament, 'Support for culture in the Eastern Neighbourhood', Press Packs, 27 June 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/nest/dv/nest_20140213_14/nest_20140213_14en.pdf [2016-11-04].

6 Domestic developments in Belarus following the presidential election of 19 December 2010 and repressions of Belarusian opposition.

7 de Waal, 'Expanding...' op.cit.

As a result of Ukraine's resignation, the situation spiralled out of control. The developments commonly referred to as the Euromaidan and its aftermath attest to that. The outcome of the decision is tragic for Ukraine, i.e. war with Russia, annexation of Crimea, destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine, dire economic and military situation, etc.

The fourth Eastern Partnership Summit took place in Riga on May 21-22, 2015 during the Latvian presidency of the EU Council. This EaP Summit presented a critical momentum for the EU in terms of identifying its response to the Russo-Ukrainian war. The crisis brought about unprecedented challenges to the security and economic interests of the EU and its member states which should be faced accordingly.⁸ The stakes and expectations related to that summit were high. Nevertheless, the summit brought disappointing results. The Summit's final declaration reads that the EaP aims "at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation and is not directed against anyone."⁹ Indeed, "if ever there was a chance for European Union leaders to show courage and take risks, it was at the Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit that took place in Riga on May 21–22."¹⁰ In the same manner, Andrew Michta argued that

the EU has no desire to offer any meaningful prospects of membership to the six partners (though only three, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, are really in play). Without this overarching inducement, the Eastern Partnership will soon degenerate into another exercise in bureaucratic futility. [...] Europe's timidity in Riga and its unwillingness to offer Eastern Partnership countries a clear path to membership will be revealed as a major geostrategic mistake.¹¹

Nearly two years after the Riga Summit, on the eve of the year 2017, in spite of the growing death toll in Ukraine, and mounting in-

8 Cf. T. Stępniewski, 'The EU's Eastern Partnership and the Way Forward After Riga', *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, vol. XXIV, no. 1-2, 2015, pp. 17-27.

9 European Council, 'Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit', Riga, 21-22 May 2015, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/21-22/> [2016-06-30].

10 J. Dempsey, 'The EU's Blindness About Eastern Europe', *Strategic Europe*, Carnegie Europe, 28 May, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60229> [2015-05-28].

11 A.A. Michta, 'After the Summit', *The American Interest*, 25 May 2015, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/05/25/after-the-summit/> [2015-06-15].

stability in the region, the fate of the EaP is yet to be defined. The following section points to the major issues that may in fact be the source of that uncertainty.

2. Issues and developments and the EU's capacity to respond to developments beyond the EU's eastern border

The objective of this section is to highlight a series of developments that have effectively affected the EU's capacity to address challenges and problems that have been unfolding beyond the EU's eastern border over the past years. It is argued that inasmuch as the evolution of Russia's role has to be taken into consideration in this regard, also the developments in the EU member states as well as at the level of the EU institutions weigh in in the analysis. This section sheds light on these issues.

Several developments over the past few years have influenced the developments in the EU and induced a seemingly unprecedented dynamic in the process of European integration. As a result, disintegrative tendencies have been prompted, most aptly manifested by the Brexit referendum.¹² At the same time, however, efforts aimed at redefining the EU's role and purpose domestically and internationally have been triggered producing tangible outcomes such as the EU Global Strategy¹³. These developments, while changing the EU itself, have also had an impact on the EU's stance towards its neighbours, both in terms of the EU's interest and capabilities.

Certainly, each of these developments and processes, including the crisis in the euro area, the Brexit referendum, the war in Syria, the threat of terrorism, the migration and refugee crises, the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine constitute challenges that the EU has to address. The twist of the situation is that the key actors involved at the EU-level, including the European Commission, the Eu-

12 C. Mazzucelli, A. Visvizi, R. Bee, 'Secular States in a "Security Community": The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 9, no. 3, 2016, pp. 16-27.

13 EEAS, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, Brussels: European External Action Service (EEAS), June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [2016-11-02].

ropean Council, the Council, the European Parliaments and the EU member states are divided as to what the nature of the EU's response to those challenges should be. Certainly, divisions have always been present among those actors. Today, however, it seems that the prospect of reaching a consensus is more difficult than ever. The case of Russia, including the annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine, and the EU sanctions imposed on Russia, confirm that the status quo is fragile and by no means to be taken for granted.

There is no denying that Russia's role in international affairs has evolved over the past years¹⁴, essentially turning it from the West's 'strategic partner' to 'strategic problem'¹⁵. Fundamental in the debate Russia's role in international affairs post-1991 is the question of how a country once considered to have entered the path of democratization and economic liberalization, proved to disregard the rules and norms of peaceful co-existence and territorial integrity upon which international cooperation is based. The tacit understanding here is that once we will have understood the factors behind Russia's 'transformation', we will be able to find a remedy to the status quo.

The key lines of the debate on Russia today is that it has turned in to a 'neo-revisionist' power, and that this in turn was necessary for Russia to enter the confrontation over Ukraine.¹⁶ Arguably, Russia's foreign policy change was motivated by four inter-related factors, including the gradual deterioration of the EU-Russia relationship, the gradual breakdown of an inclusive pan-European security system that enabled Russia to retain some autonomy, the weakening of the US' claims to 'exceptionalism' and global leadership, and the ideology of 'democratism'.¹⁷ As Sakwa argues, this neo-revisionism does not denote an attempt at complete annihilation of the existing international order but rather an emphasis on the fact that all powers will follow

14 Cf. A. Visvizi (2010) 'Pozycja Rosji w stosunkach międzynarodowych' [Russia's role in international relations], in: K.A. Kłosiński (ed.), *Rosja: ambicje i możliwości w XXI wieku* [Russia: ambitions and opportunities in the 21st century], Lublin: Catholic University of Lublin Press, pp. 287-307.

15 C. Bildt, 'Russia, the European Union and the Eastern Partnership', *ECFR Riga Series*, 5 July 2015, <http://www.ecfr.eu/wider/rigapapers> [2016-11-01].

16 R. Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*, London–New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015, p. 30.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 31-34.

international rules and regulations and respect Russia's 'equivalent' position in the system.¹⁸

From a different angle, in the debate on the evolution of Russia's role in international affairs, it is also argued that Russia's anti-Western stance may be linked to the West's naivety, as exemplified by the provision of support to Boris Yeltsin, seen in the West as the harbinger of democratisation in Russia. In a similar manner, it is argued that the West sought to shape its cooperation with Russia on the precepts of values and ideals that have defined the West, although liberal democracies are no longer a role-model for Russia.¹⁹ It is also emphasized however that Russia itself has not succeeded in turning the defeat of 1991 into a positive power of change that would turn Russia into a rule-based country.²⁰

3. The EaP on the map of the EU's external relations agenda

Following the EU's eastern enlargement of 2004/2007, the EU's eastern border changed., Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova became immediate neighbours of the EU, bringing about new geopolitical concerns, challenges and opportunities in the broader area of East-Central Europe and Russia. The major weakness inherent in the EaP is the lack of clear prospect of the possible future EU membership. The lack of the EU's promise of these countries' membership has been assessed in the debate on the EaP as evidence that the EU treats these countries' European vocation sceptically. Perhaps most importantly though, it has been argued that the lack of a clear EU membership prospect may in fact suggest that the EU sees its relations with the EaP countries as a function of its relations with Russia. Given the fact that the war in eastern Ukraine continues, that the impact of the Kremlin disinformation and propaganda in the West may be more pervasive than initially assumed, and that Russia is engaged in the war in Syria, the question of the EaP on the map of the EU's external relations is as important

18 Ibid., p. 34.

19 L. Szewcowa, 'Polem gry Kremla jest chaos' [Chaos is the playing field], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 June 2015.

20 Ibid.

as ever. Its salience, increasingly, is nevertheless bound to the priority the entire ENP will be given in the EU external relations strategy.

In the debate on the ENP it has been frequently stressed that it is not an effective policy tool and that it is filled with constraints and contradictions.²¹ First of all, the ENP encompasses a group of several dozen countries, spanning from Morocco to Georgia, which manifest different potential and aspirations. These countries' interests and strategies objectives do not converge and therefore if the ENP is to deliver, greater emphasis needs to be placed on the case-by-case method and so on the 'more for more' principle. The effectiveness of the ENP and so of the EaP depends on the EU itself as well. EU decision-makers perceive the eastern neighbours in a technocratic manner and they are insensitive towards the addressees of the Community's initiatives. History proves that the perspective of integration was the greatest guarantee of successful internal changes in the applicant countries. Unfortunately, the EU is unable to ensure the membership for countries of the eastern neighbourhood, even in the long-term perspective. The Riga Summit of May 2015 attests to that inability. Moreover, the EU is perceived in a negative light by eastern decision-makers and citizens due to the visa regime, which resulted in the emergence of a 'glass curtain' on the eastern borders of the EU.

Overall, the ENP, and the EaP specifically, has not led to a qualitative change in relations between the EU and the partners-countries. Moreover, as the Russian Federation seeks to hold the EaP partner-countries in its own area of influence, the EaP has turned into a hostage of the EU relations with Russia. Simultaneously, as a consequence of the Arab Spring and the war in Syria, the EU's perception of its southern neighbours changed. That is, the Southern Mediterranean is perceived as a major source of threat for the EU and its member-states; a perception that reverberates on the NATO forum as well. In practical terms it means that the competition for financial resources to be committed to the Southern and Eastern Dimension of the ENP will become particularly fierce in negotiations on the next Multiannual

21 G. Gromadzki, 'Five Theses on European Neighbourhood Policy', *Policy Brief*, September 2008, Warsaw: Batory Foundation; cf. A. Balcer, L. Revak, 'Ukraine: European Australia or Congo?', *New Eastern Europe*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2012, pp. 59-63.

Financial Framework. The challenge is that given the scale of problems arising in the SEM region, and an overall perception of that the EU eastern neighbourhood is relatively stable and predictable, greater emphasis will be given to the Southern Dimension of the ENP, at the expense of the EaP. The problem is that since Russia already interprets the ENP in a competitive manner, a weakened resolve of the EU towards providing assistance to the EaP partner-countries might trigger incentives for the Kremlin to seek to continue its attempts of re-establishing its influence on the western and southern verges of the post-Soviet space²². The scale of the challenge, that effectively means that the EaP is less attractive to the key actors operating on the EU scene was captured aptly by EaP Civil Society Forum:

The EaP faces a number of new challenges, including: decrease in ranking of the initiative on the European Union's agenda, open challenges to regional security, crisis of relations between Russia and the EU, a widening gap between those EaP countries that have signed and those that have not signed the Association Agreements (AAs), the risks of 'pragmatization' of the EU's relations with the countries, which have not signed the AAs with the EU, the diminishing role of civil society and the weakening of the democracy and human rights dimension in the Eastern Partnership.²³

References

- Balcer, A., Revak, L., 'Ukraine: European Australia or Congo?', *New Eastern Europe*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2012, pp. 59-63.
- Bildt, C., 'Russia, the European Union and the Eastern Partnership', *ECFR Riga Series*, 5 July 2015, <http://www.ecfr.eu/wider/rigapapers> [2016-11-01].
- Council of the European Union, *Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit*, 7 May 2009, 8435/09, Presse 78, Prague, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf [2016-12-18].
- 22 T. Stępniewski, *Geopolityka regionu Morza Czarnego w pozimnowojennym świecie* [Geopolitics of the Black Sea region in the post-Cold War world], Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2011, pp. 77-118.
- 23 EaP-CSF, 'Strategy of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum for 2015-2017', Eastern Partnership-Civil Society Forum (EaP-CSF), [http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/EaP-CSF-Strategy-2015-2017-05112014\(1\).pdf](http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/EaP-CSF-Strategy-2015-2017-05112014(1).pdf) [2016-12-12].

- de Waal, T., 'Expanding the EU's Ostpolitik', *Strategic Europe*, 24 October 2011, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45792> [2016-12-18].
- Dempsey, J., 'The EU's Blindness About Eastern Europe', *Strategic Europe*, Carnegie Europe, 28 May, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60229> [2015-05-28].
- EaP-CSF, 'Strategy of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum for 2015-2017', Eastern Partnership-Civil Society Forum (EaP-CSF), [http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/EaP-CSF-Strategy-2015-2017-05112014\(1\).pdf](http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/EaP-CSF-Strategy-2015-2017-05112014(1).pdf) [2016-12-12].
- EEAS, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, Brussels: European External Action Service (EEAS), June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [2016-11-02].
- European Commission, 'European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper', *Communication from the Commission*, COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004.
- European Council, 'Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit', Riga, 21-22 May 2015, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/21-22/> [2016-06-30].
- European Parliament, 'Support for culture in the Eastern Neighbourhood', Press Packs, 27 June 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/nest/dv/nest_20140213_14/nest_20140213_14en.pdf [2016-11-04].
- Gromadzki, G., 'Five Theses on European Neighbourhood Policy', *Policy Brief*, September 2008, Warsaw: Batory Foundation.
- Mazzucelli, C., Visvizi, A., Bee, R., 'Secular States in a "Security Community": The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 9, no. 3, 2016, pp. 16-27.
- Michta, A.A., 'After the Summit', *The American Interest*, 25 May 2015, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/05/25/after-the-summit/> [2015-06-15].
- Sakwa, R., *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*, London–New York: I.B.Tauris, 2015, p. 30.
- Stepniewski T., *Geopolityka regionu Morza Czarnego w pozimnowojennym świecie* [Geopolitics of the Black Sea region in the post-Cold War world], Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2011, pp. 77-118.
- Stepniewski, T., 'The EU's Eastern Partnership and the Way Forward After Riga', *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, vol. XXIV, no. 1-2, 2015, pp. 17-27.
- Szewcowa, L., 'Polem gry Kremla jest chaos' [Chaos is the playing field], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 June 2015.
- Visvizi, A. (2010) 'Pozycja Rosji w stosunkach międzynarodowych' [Russia's role in international relations], in: K.A. Kłosiński (ed.), *Rosja: ambicje i możliwości w XXI wieku* [Russia: ambitions and opportunities in the 21st century], Lublin: Catholic University of Lublin Press, pp. 287-307.

About the authors

Janusz Danecki, Professor at the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Oriental Faculty, the University of Warsaw. Specializes in Arabic linguistics and Islam, especially Islam in the Arab World. Lectures on political Islam and the Arab World at the University of Warsaw.

Krzysztof Falkowski, Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the World Economy Research Institute of the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH). His main research interests include: matters related to international competitiveness and innovativeness, systemic transformation (including institutional) in East European and the CIS, their economic situation and place in the contemporary world economy as well as the EU's (and in particular, Poland's) economic relations with Russia and Eastern Partnership countries. E-mail address: kfalkow@sgh.waw.pl

Mirosław Filipowicz, Ph.D. habil., Director of the Institute of East-Central Europe (IESW), Professor at the Institute of History, the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. His research interests include: historiography and methodology of history, history of Russia. E-mail address: dyrektor.iesw@gmail.com

Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, Ph.D. habil, assistant professor at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Economic Sociology at the Warsaw School of Economics and vice Dean for Masters' Studies. She earned her Ph.D. habil. in the study of religion with the focus on Islamic studies, and Ph.D. in economics. Her research interests include: the Middle East, Islam in Europe. E-mail address: gorak@sgh.waw.pl

Joanna Kwiecień, Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Studies, Warsaw School of Economics. Her research interests include: public goods and public expenditure theory, economy of highly advanced technologies, EU affairs. E-mail address: jk31613@sgh.waw.pl

Marta Ostrowska-Chałupa, Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Studies, Warsaw School of Economics. Her research interests include: development economics with a focus on structural policies and strategies, trade liberalization, regional economic integration and its effects.
E-mail address: marta.k.ostrowska@gmail.com

Tomasz Stępniewski, Ph.D. habil., assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. His research interests include: EU eastern policy, international relations of the Commonwealth of the Independent States' area, Russia's policy towards Eastern Europe.
E-mail address: tomasz.stepniewski5@gmail.com

Agata Stolarz, Ph.D., Research Fellow at the Institute of East-Central Europe (IESW). Areas of expertise: memory studies, incl. oral history and politics of memory in East-Central Europe.
E-mail address: agatastolarz@gmail.com

Joanna Stryjek, Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Institute for International Studies and Deputy Dean of Bachelor's Studies, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH). Her research interests include: innovation policy and national systems of innovation; Economic and Monetary Union; European Neighborhood Policy.
E-mail address: joanna.stryjek@sgh.waw.pl

Anna Visvizi, Ph.D., Head of Research at the Institute of East-Central Europe (IESW), Assistant Professor at DEREΕ-The American College of Greece. Areas of expertise: EU – politics and economics, Greece, the Visegrád countries (V4); global safety and security, including transatlantic relations.
E-mail address: avisvizi@gmail.com

Katarzyna Żukrowska, Professor, Director of the Institute for International Studies and Head of the International Security Department, Warsaw School of Economics. Her research interests include: the political economy of transition and transformation, international political economy, EU budget, EMU, defense economics.
E-mail address: kzukro@sgh.waw.pl